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D. A. Shiek, C. Layne, and R. L. Miller
Western Kentucky University

Department of Psychology

The basic psychometric characteristics of the Common Belief Scale
(CBS) of the YIPTIS, Your Irrational Personality Trait Inventory Score,
were investigated.

conceptual

The CBS was formulated within

framework of Rational Behavior Therapy.

Designed for use with adults

of at least normal intelligence, its purpose is to evaluate the strength
of identification with a specified set of common irrational beliefs
which are hypothesized to lead to emotional disturbance.
Subjects taking part in this study were volunteers ranging in age
from seventeen tc twenty-seven.
composed of 1

The total sample of 186 subjects was

female- and 81 males.

Approximately one half of the

subjects were administered the CBS and the Taylor ranifest Anxiety Scale
(TMAS.

The remaining subjects were administered the CPS in a two week

test-retest design.

Item means, standard deviations, and item-total

correlations were computed for each item on the CBS.

The reliability

of the scale was investigated by test-retest and split-half procedures.
The structural validity of the instrument was investigated through a
factor analysis procedure conducted to determine the number and strength
of the factors measured.

The concurrent validity of the CES was inves-

tigated in a correlate desian between the CBS and the TrAS.

The results

indicated that the majority of items were reliable indicators of the
total score and contributed to the reliability of the instrument.
Suggestions were made to improve weak items.

The reliability procedures

all yielded coefficients of approximately .80.

Structural validity was
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investigated by a factor analysis which yielded fourteen reliable
factors; ten of these factors were conceptually related to specific
irrational beliefs or to the central concepts of the RBT theory.

The

concurrent validity of the instrument was supported by a low but significant correlation between the CBS and the TMAS.

It was concluded that

in its present form the CPS of the YIPTIS is an adecuately reliable
instrument for its intended use as an aid in identifying irrational
beliefs in a therapeutic setting.

Recommendations for improvement of

the scale and further research are discussed.

Introduction
The central theme of Rational Behavior Training (RBT) is that
emotional or rsycholorical disturbances are largely the result of illorical or irrational thinking.

It has been hypotheri7ed that if an

individual can identify and rid himself of his own irrational beliefs
and consequent behaviors and then subsequently learn to base his thinking
and behavior on a defined set of rational criteria, he will lead a much
happier and more effective life (Ellis, 1962; Goodman & Maultsby, 1974).
The YIPTIS, Your Irrational Personality Trait Inventory Score,
formulated within the conceptual framework of RBT, contains 179 common
irrational perceptions, traits, and beliefs ascribed to by most people
to varying degrees and causing them emotional distress (Maultsby, 1971).
The items of the YIPTIS are written in the form of what ElliF (1961)
terms "self-talk."

Self-talk is thinkinr in the form of an inner

dialogue or unspoken conversation with oneself.

Self-talk that is irra-

tional can lead to emotional pain.
The YIPTIS is composed of three subtests which are each arranged
in a Likert scale format (Maultsby, 1971).

The Common Perception Scale

(CPS) was designed to reflect irrational "perceptions or observations
which most people in this society make about themselves" (Maultsby,
1971, p. 19).

The Common Trait Scale (CTS) is an attempt to "reflect

irrational traitF or habits typical of many people" (Maultsby, 1971,
r. 12).

The Common Belief Scale (CBS) was designed to "reflect irrational

beliefs which most people in our society hold to some degree" (Maultsby,
1971, P.12). According to Maultsby (1971) strong identification with the
1

2

perceptions, traits, and beliefs contained in the YIPTIS will leave the
individual vulnerable to sustained negative emotions and prone to neurotic
behavior.
The aim of the YIPTIS is to give a rapid self-assessment of an
individual's irrational thinking and behaviors.

This information can

then be used within the RPT framework to eliminate the dysfunctional
thinking and behavior patterns.
The extent of the YIPTIS' usefulness was unclear due to a lack of
reported research with the instrument.

This study was designed to in-

vestigate the basic psychometric characteristics of the YIPTIS as an
instrument for identifying neurosis producing beliefs.

Review of the Literature
Cognition and Emotion
Rational Pehavior Training is a system of psychotherapy formulated
by Albert Ellis (1962) and developed by Maxie Maultsby (1971).

It is

based on a model of psychopathology which assumes that emotional arousal
is largely influenced by cognitive processes (Ellis, 1955).

Emotional

disturbances and most forms of psychopatholoay in western civilization
according to the theory are caused by the belief in and actions based
upon a set of common illoaical and self-defeating ideas (Ellis, 1961).
Relief from emotional disturbance is most efficiently and effectively
achieved in rational therapy by first discovering the illogical and
irrational beliefs an individual holds which are causing his disturbance.
Secondly, the therapist demonstrates how and why these beliefs are
Irrational and self-defeatinF.

Next, the therapist enaaFes the indivi-

dual in actively challenging and ridding himself of his irrational beliefc.
Finally, the therapist teaches a more rational philosophy and belief
system on which the individual can base his subsenuent behavior.
In order to understand the role that these irrational beliefs Play
in emotional disturbance it is first necessary to understand the RBT
theory of the nature and anatomy of emotions.

This theory is based on

the assumption that human emotion is intrinsically an attitudinal and
cognitive process (Ellis, 1962).

However, in addition to the coanitive

process, Ellis stresses the importance of the interdependent physiology
of the human body systems and processes in the arousal of what we call
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emotion.

Ellis (1962) cited Cobb (1950) in pointing out that the human

life processes of sensing, moving, thinking, and emoting are integrally
related and operate through the sensorimotor processes, autonomic
nervous system, and the the cognitive processes.

Control over one's

emotional feeling may be achieved in one of four major ways:
(a) by electrical or biochemical means (e.g., electroshock
treatment, barbituates, or tranquilizing or energizing drugs);
(b) by using one's sensorimotor system (e.g., doing movement
exercises or using yoga breathing techniques); (c) by employing
one's existing emotional states and prejudices (e.g., changing
oneself out of love for a parent or therapist); and (d) by
using one's cerebral processes (e.g., reflecting, thinking,
or telling oneself to calm down or become excited). (Ellis,
1962, D. 10)
These modes of effecting the emotional state frequently interract as
when the yoga practitioner through sensorimotor processes alters his
body biochemistry, and also his cognitive processes.

RBI' theory

stresses the importance of the role of cognitive processes in causing
and sustaining emotional reactions.
Much physiological evidence for the relationship between cognition
and emotion has been reviewed by Bousfield and 0rbison (1952).

They

concluded that contradictory to the previous beliefs that emotional
processes originate in subcortical or hypothalmic centers of the brain,
the cortex and frontal lobes seemed to be involved in the inhibition,
instigation, and sustaining of emotional reactions.

In a comprehensive

discussion of emotion Arnold (1960) stressed the personally evaluative
nature of emotions.

She defined emotion as:

the felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as
good (beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised
as bad (harmful). This attraction or aversion is accompanied
by a pattern of physiological changes organized toward approach
or withdrawal. (Arnold, 1960, p. 192)
The view that emotions are a kind of personal appraisal or evaluation
with physiological correlates is quite similar to Ellis' formulation.
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"Emotions may therefore simply be evaluations which have a strong bodily
component, while so-called nonemotional attitudes may be evaluations
with a relatively weak bodily component" (Ellis, 1962, P• 144)•
Both Ellis and Arnold attribute the origins of an emotional response
to evaluative thinking.

Because of the highly developed language system

which exists in western civilization most human thinking takes the form
of internal words, phrases, and sentences.

Thus the individual is con-

stantly describing, interpreting, and evaluating his world to himself
through his internal language or what Ellis (1961,) terms "self-talk."
Strongly evaluative self-talk in relation to any object, event, person,
etc. is the source of most felt emotion.
Evidence for the assumption that self-talk can induce emotional
reactions has been offered by Velten (1967) who experimentally induced
feelings of elation and depression in subjects through the use of selfreferent statements.
on a random basis.

Subjects were assigned to five treatment groups

One group read and concentrated on sixty self-

referent statements intended to be elating.

A second group read sixty

self-referent statements intended to be depressing.

A third group read

sixty statements which were neither self-referent nor pertaining to
mood; this was done in order to control for the effects of reading and
experimental participation per se.

The fourth and fifth groups were

controls for demand characteristics of the experiment.

Before the

stimulus war administered, two measures of mood were taken.

Then

following the administration of the stimulus the subjects were given
seven behavioral tasks to perform.

7easures of performance on five of

the seven tasks distinguished significantly the experimentally induced
depressed and elated groups from the control groups.

6

Another experiment designed to test Ellis' assumptions about the
causative role which self-talk plays in emotional arousal was conducted
by Rimm and Litvack (1969).

The experimental subjects of this study

read triads of sentences culminating in nerative affective conclusions
in which the first sentence of each triad was an observation, e.g.,
"I failed this test."

The second sentence was an inference, e.g.,

"I may be kicked out of school," and the third sentence of each triad
was an evaluation. e.g., "That would be awful."

Control subjects read

triads of sentences which were affectively neutral and which did not
culminate in evaluative conclusions.

It was hypothesized that subjects

reading the negative affective sentences would have a greater emotional
response than the subjects reading the affectively neutral sentences.
It was also hypothesized that in the negative affective sentence triads
the emotional response of the subjects would become greater as subjects
read from the first sentence of the triad (observation), to the second
sentence (inference), to the third sentence (evaluative).

The sentences

in each triad were read ten seconds apart, with lc seconds between
triads.

The emotional response was determined by measures of the

Galvanic Skin Response (3SR) and respiratory changes of the subjects.
The themes for the sentences were those juda' to be relevant to college
students.
The hypothesis that subjects reading the nerative affective sentences
would have a greater emotional response than subjects reading neutral
sentences was supported.

However, as Rimm and Litvack (1969) concluded,

since affective stimuli elicit more emotion than neutral stimuli by
definition,

he result was as much a validation of methodology as support

for the hypothesis.

The second hypothesis that the greatest emotional

7

response would be elicited by the evaluative sentences followed by the
inferential sentences, with the observational sentences arousing the
least response,was not supported.

In fact, the observational sentences

were associated with the greatest emotional response in this study.
The subjects' Immediate emotional response to the observational
sentence is entirely consistent with the evaluative thinking view of
emotions when understood in terms of what maultsby (1971) calls "thoughtshorthand."

maultsby explains that certain familiar situations or

people elicit a reflexive emotional response in which no self-talk is
apparent.

It may actually seem to an individual that a situation caused

an emotional reaction with no intervening personal evaluation.

What

has happened, however, is that the familiar situation which has always
been responded to in the past with emotion-arousing self-talk has
accuired conditioned stimulus properties and is capable of producing
a reflexive emotional response.

The relevancy of the sentence themes

In the Rimm and Litvack study could well have provided an opportunity
for a thought-shorthand reaction reFultinr in immediate emotional
responses by subjects to the observational sentences.
In keeping with the view that emotions are personal evaluations
with coanitive origins and subsenuent physiological correlates Ellis
(1962) distinguishes between an immediate or intuitive emotional reaction
and prolonaed or sustained emotions.

The distinction

is

best viewed

as relative rather than reflecting any major difference in the nature
or oriain of the emotion.

Both the immediate emotional reaction and

sustained emotion involve a sensing-moving-thinking-emoting complex
and both in varying degrees rely on past experience for an interpretive
evaluation.

The sustained emotion is the result of a person's "reflective

appraisal" of a situation based on his attitudes, philosophy of life,
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etc. The immediately felt emotion similarly is influenced by the person's
attitudes and philosophy, but is elicited as an immediate sensory response
to a stimulus, and little or no "reflective appraisal" is involved.
Ellis (1962) uses as an example of a sustained emotion: an individual who narrowly escapes being hit by a car while walking across the
street.

The pedestrian's immediate emotional reaction as he sees the

car bearing down on him is fear.

This immediate emotional response

involves the sensing (visual)-thinking ("I an in danger")-moving (flight)
-emoting (fear) complex.

Now if the individual continues to think about

the event throughout the day and he remains emotionally affected by it,
his feeling of fear or anxiety becomes a sustained emotion.

To maintain

the fear or anxiety in this way the individual must be thinking about
the event in a highly personalized and evaluative way, e.g., "I could
have been killed.

How horrible:"

Irrational Ideas and Emotional Disturbance
Prolonged emotional reactions are inseparable from sustained
strongly evaluative self-talk.

By continually talking to himself about

how awful (evaluating) it would have been had he been struck by the car,
the individual in this example actually created and sustained his anxiety.
To unnecessarily sustain unwanted negative emotions with thinking that
is illogical and irrational causes most of the emotional and psychological disturbances in our society (Ellis, 1962).

Ellis states that

there are 11 common irrational beliefs which most people socialized in
our culture accept to varying degrees, and which "seem inevitably to
lead to widespread neurosis."
The 11 common irrational ideas are:
1. The idea that it is a dire necessity for an adult human
being to be loved or approved by virtually every significant
other person in his community.

9

?. The idea that one should be thoroughly competent, adequate,
and achieving in all possible respects if one is to consider
oneself worthwhile.
3. The idea that certain people are bad, wicked, or villainous
and that they should be severely blamed and punished for
their villainy.
4. The idea that it is awful and catastrophic when things
are not the way one would very much like them to be.
5. The idea that human unhappiness is externally caused and
that people have little or no ability to control their sorrows
and disturbances.
A. The idea that if something is or may be dangerous or fear-nme , one should be terribly concerned about it and should
keep dwelling on the possibility of its occurring.
7. The idea that it is easier to avoid than to face certain
life difficulties and self-responsibilities.
P. The idea that one should be dependent on oth_rs and needs
someone stronger than oneself on whom to rely.
9. The idea that one's past history is an all-important
determiner of one's present behavior and that because
(Dmething once strongly affected one's life, it should indefinitely have a similar effect.
10. The idea that one should become auite upset over other
people's problems and disturbances.
11. The idea that there is invariably a right, precise,
and perfect solution to human problems and that it is catastrophic if this perfect solution is not found.
(Ellis, 1062, p. 61)
In support of Ellis' contention that belief in these 11 irrational
ideas is neurosis producing MacDonald and Games (1972) found a positive
correlation between endorsement of these irrational ideas and several
measures of psychopathology.

Using Ellis' 11 irrational values as

items they developed a Likert scale with a range of scores of from I
(completely agree) to 0 (completely disagree) which indicated the degree
to which an individual identified with each irrational value.

This

scale was correlated with the California Psychological Inventory (CPI),
Eysenck's Neuroticism Scale, and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale.
Correlations with the 18 CPI scales were all in the predicted direction
with 10 reaching significance at the .05 level.

Significant corre-

lations (p4.01) were also obtained between the Ellis scale scores and
the Eysenck Neuroticism Scale and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale.
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These 11 ideas are irrational and illogical in two basic ways.
First, many of these ideas reflect distortions of reality.

Beck (1966)

has identified six types of cognitive distortion made by depressed
patients: 1) arbitrary interpretation - forming an interpretation with
no factual evidence to support the conclusion or when the conclusion is
contrary to the evidence, ?) selective abstraction - focuses on detail
taken out of context, 3) overgeneralization - drawing a general conclusion about one's ability, performance, or worth on the basis of a single
incident, 4) magnification and minimization - errors in evaluation so
gross as to constitute distortion,

inexact labelina - in which the

affective reaction is proportional to the descriptive labeling of the
event rather than to the actual intensity of a traumatic situation.

All

of these distortions were distinguished by a characteristic bias against
oneself.

Similar paralogical distortions were also noted in Beck's

non-depressed patient control group, surgesting that cognitive distortion may be common to many types of psychopatholory.
The making of unrealistic demands upon the world is a characteristic
neurotic distortion that is common to many of Ellis' 11 irrat'onal
ideas.

An unrealistic demand may be signaled by the demanding individual's

use of the wer-2 "should" in relation to the desired event.

The use of

the word should may indicate an expectation that things will be a
certain way.

Vertes (1971) calls this the "should of obligation,"

because the individual seems to believe that the world is obliged to
align with his wishes.

Vertes contrasts the irrational should of obli-

gation with the realistic "should of probability" which indicates a
strong or fairly definite probability that some event will take place.
Vertes identifies four elements which distinguish the should of obligation from the should of probability:
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1) The event is treated as an absolute rather than as a
probability. 2) Other activities are based on the fact that
the expected event will occur. 3) Feeling that someone is
responsible for the expectancy not materializing. 4) Feeling
that things can be easily and readily changed to meet
expectations. (Vertes, 1971, p. 23)
The should of obligation is an irrational distortion because
absolute statements frequently are not justified in the context of the
situation, nor are they consistent with reality.

The use of absolute

statements frequently creates artificial "needs" out of "desirables."
For example, "I must have an apology" is a created need.

Thinking in

these terms generally leads to catastrophizina if this demand, now an
artificially created need, is not met, e.g., "This is unbearable."
Demanding and expecting that the world be different than it is often
turns an undesirable situation into an unbearable one.

In addition,

if the expected event does not occur the person may refuse to recognize
the discrepancy or may initially feel confusion or some strong emotion.
It almost naturally follows that someone must be responsible for the
expectancy not materializing.
at oneself or at another.

The accusing finger of blame

is

pointed

It is then magically expected that once the

wrong doer is aware of his mistake or is made to feel guilty he will
readily change to meet the expectancy.

The unrealistic demand implied

by the irrational use of the word should is one common distortion of
reality which results in strong negative emotions.
The second and possibly the most harmful element of the common 11
irrational beliefs is contained in the popular notion of personal worth.
The popular view, according to Ellis (1962), equates a person's behavior,
achievements, and the evaluation of others with the individual's
personal worth or intrinsic human value.

This is a self-defeating

philosophy In that it unnecessarily leads the individual to evaluate
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himself as a "fool" if he makes a foolish mistake, a "loser" if he loses,
and "unlovable" if he is rejected.

Such a needlessly self-deprecating

view can result In such feelings as self-hatred, depression, or anxiety.
To enuate one's worth with one's achievements makes success and
achievement a necessary condition for self-acceptance.

An artificial

need" is thus created, and as Ellis contends:
Since no one can be competent and masterful in all or most
respects and most people cannot be outstanding in even
one major respect...to demand that one must succeed is
to make oneself prey to anxiety and feelings of worthlessness. (Ellis, 1q62, p. 63)
The philosophy of achievement sets the individual in a competitive
position with others, in which he is not only striving for his best
(which is desirable) but is comparinF himself to the best in others.
He thus relinquishes control of the situation because he cannot control
the behavior of others, and since the probability of becoming the best
in anything is quite low for any individual he seems doomed to failure
and feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness (Ellis, 1962).
Finally, the idea that an adult human being's self esteem and
personal worth depend on the approval or love of others artificially
transforms love-approval from a highly desirable thing to a dire
necessity.

The individual who does not feel loved or approved by his

significant others is likely to feel like a worthless person, and
virtually everyone is faced with disapproval or rejection at one time
or another if not daily.

Even the person who manages to win the approval

of everyone he considers important, if he believes this to be absolutely
necessary, will worry about keeping it.

In striving for the approval

of others the individual becomes less self-directing and gives up many
of his own desires and preferences.

In the end, as Ellis states, "He

is likely to behave so insecurely and annoyingly around others that

uvi
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does lose their approval or respect and thereby defeats
1962,

goals"

own

D. 62).

Achievement and approval are both highly valued in our society.
They are valued because they are generally beneficial to both society
and the individual.

However, the belief that a person is worthless,

and need feel worthless because he does not acheve or is not approved
of is without foundation.

This belief along with beliefs that are

based on a distorted view of reality are challenged and replaced with
a more rational and self-enhancing philosophy in RBT (Criddle, 1974).
The goal of RPT is to eliminate unnecessary unhappiness so the
individual is allowed the freedom to live his life as pleasurably and
effectively as he can (Ellis, 1962).

This is achieved by changing the

individual's belief system from one based on many irrational assumptions
which result in many self-defeating behaviors to a belief system that
is more consistently logical and rational.

Rational "is that ...

(behavior, emotion, or thouphti which is congruent with reality and that
helps the individual to gain satisfaction and to avoid pain" (Vertes,
1070, p. 19).
It is the responsibility of the individual and only he can determine for himself the rationality of any emotion, thought, or behavior
in any situation.

7aultsby (1971) offers five criteria to guide the

individual in makinp this determination.

The rationality of any thought,

emotion or behavior can be determined if the individual asks himself:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Is it based on the acceptance of objective reality?
Is it life preserving?
Does it enable me to achieve my self-determined goals?
Does it create a minimum of significant internal conflict?
Does it create a minimum of significant conflict with my
environment?

The amount of conflict considered to be significant is "the amount that
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you don't want to have and will act to avoid" (Maultsby, 1971, p. 4).
The rationality of any behavior is relative.
are met the more rational the behavior.

The more criteria that

Generally, If a person meets

three out of five criteria most of the time his behavior can be considered rational.

These criteria are designed to serve as guides for

Oecision making by the individual, not decision makers for him.

Cnly

he alone can choose the rational approach for himself in any life situation (Maultsby, 1971).
To assist the individual in realizing and eliminating his selfdefeating distortions the therapist repeatedly points out the illogical
and irrational nature of this thinking which is creating the emotional
disturbance.

The individual is encouraged and assisted through -everal

self help technioues to discover his own distorted thinking and to
correct it with a more rational view (Goodman & Maultsby, 1974).
m.any of the common 11 irrational beliefs are associated with the
concept of one's personal worth.

The RBT therapist attacks the notion

that one's personal worth has an extrinsic nature and is somehow related
to achievement or approval.

The therapist substitutes the concept of

the "fallible human being" (Maultsby, 1974), which acknowledges man as
an imperfect, mistake-making creature who possesses intrinsic personal
value which is conceived of as "the individual's being, aliveness, or
becoming - which gives his the possibility or potentiality of being
happy" (Ellis, 1962, p. 153).
Thus, the RET therapist striver to replace the individual's irrational beliefs about himself and his world with a more realistic and
rational view.

The therapist assists the individual in evaluating his

behavior in terms of the defined criteria for rational behavior so that
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the individual may more effectively act to achieve his self-determined
Foals.
Numerous discussions of clinical case studies are available in the
literature which demonstrate that RBT has been used effectively as a
therapeutic techniaue for a variety of emotional and behavioral disturbances in both children and adults (Ellis, 1961; Goodman & Maultsby,
1974; Grossack, 1965; Kassinove, 1972: Meichenbaum, Gilmore & Fedoravicius,
1971; Yeichenbaum & Goodman, 1971; Sherman, 1067; Wagner & Glicken, 1966).
Ellis (1961) reports success using this approach with an individual
having a lo nF history of psychopathic behavior.

Sherman (1967) has

found RBT to be useful as an approach for the treatment of alcoholics,
and Kassinove (1972) reports on his successful use of RBT in treating
a young man's fear of sexual intercourse.

Yeichenbaum, Gilmore and

Fedoravicius (1971) have demonstrated the effectiveness of RBT as treatment for speech anxiety.

The RBT approach has also been shown to be

effective in counseling children (Wagner & Glicken, 1966).

Grossack

(1965) reports that after reading the works of Albert Ellis, attending
his workshops and studying his taped therapy sessions he tried RBT on
nine heterogeneous patients.

He concluded that for him RBT worked more

quickly and effectively than the Rogerian and analytic techniques he had
been taught to use.

Goodman and Maultsby (1974) discussed the case

histories of several individuals and the sigrftficant reduction in their
self-defeating behavior and unwanted emotions following RBT.

In each

case the irrational beliefs of the client were identified and challenged.
The client was shown how his irrational beliefs were creating his emotional disturbance and how he could replace them with a more rational
belief system.

In addition, the client was given homework assignments

designed to facilitate adoption of a more rational belief system and to

3.6
help him learn new desired behaviors.

These case study examples provide

indirect evidence in support of the theoretical position of RBT.
In addition to the clinical evidence for the effectiveness of RBT
as a therapeutic techniaue, it has also been demonstrated experimentally
that RBT is effective in reducing negative affect (Burkhead, 1970;
Trexler, 1971).

In Burkhead's study four groups of subjects were given

an annoying electric shock on a random schedule with a one in five
probability of receiving the shock.
assigned to the four groups.

Varying conditions of RBT were

Group I received RBT fr it a therapist who

was present (P) during the administration of the shock.

Group II listened

to a tape recording of RBT principles during the administration of the
shock (PT).

Group III listened to a tape recording whilh reinforced

their irrational thinking about the shock situation (NT).
a magazine durinr the administration of the shock (C).

Group IV read

The emotional

responses of the subjects were defined and measured by changes in Galvanic
Skin Response (CSR) and responses on the Multiple Affective Adjective
Check List (YAACL).

It was hypothesized that the groups that were taught

RBT would have less emotional responses to the shock situation than the
group where irrational beliefs were reinforced ir the control group.
The results of Burkhead's study showed that the groups exposed to
the personal therapist (P) and the positive tape (PT) conditions had
significantly lower OSR responses and a less anxious profile on the MAACL
profiles.

No significant differences on the GSR or MAACL measures were

found between the (P) or (PT) groups, indicating that the presence per
se of the therapist had no appreciable effect on the subjects' emotional
responses.

These results support Ellis' view that irrational beliefs

result in negative affect and that if these beliefs are challenged and
replaced with a more rations/ view then the individual can rid himself
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of unwanted negative emotions.
In a controlled study Trexler (1971) tested the relative effectivet
ness of RBT, an attention placebo (relaxation training), and no treatmen
in reducing public speaking anxiety.

For his experiment Trexler randomly

divided a speech class into an RBT group, a relaxation training group,
and a nc treatment group.

Each subject gave an initial speech and two

judges rated them on three observational measures.

In addition to the

observational measures, five self report measures were taken.

Following

four sessions of treatments the subjects gave a final speech and were
retested with the same observational and self-report measures.

The

results indicated that the RBT treatment was more effective than the relaxation training in reducing public speaking anxiety as it was measured
in this experiment.

The relaxation training group also improved sig-

nificantly over the no treatment group.
Therapeutic change ultimately results when the individual challenges
replaces
and discards his irrational and neurosis-producing beliefs and
them with a more rational belief system with the guidance of an RBT
therapist (Ellis, 1962).

To challenge and discard the old belief system

it is first necessary to discover what specific beliefs the individual
holds which are inherently irrational and are responsible for his unwanted
emotions and behaviors.
Development of the YIPTIS
To aid the individual in identifying his own irrational beliefs
Maultsby (1971) developed the YIPTIS.
tories:

The YIPTIS consists of three inven-

the Common Belief Scale (CBS), the Common Perception Scale (CPS),

and the Common Trait Scale (CTS).

Coodman and Maultsby (1974) state

that a high correlation exists between these three scales.

le
The YIPTIS is a self-rating questionnaire arranred in a Likert
scale format.

The items of the scale represent irrational self-talk

which IF reflected as a perception, trait, or belief (Maultsby, 1971).
Little information on the development of the YIPTIS was available
in the literature.

Maultsby (1971), however, stater:

Starting with the knowledge of recent research in human
psychophysiology and human experimental psychology, and
adding my own observations of emotionally distressed patients
...after five years of clinical testing, I formulated the
YIPTIS, which contains the 179 most common, irrational personality traits which account for unhappiness in the daily
lives of normal people. (Yaultsby, 1971, p. 22)
A preliminary investigation by MacDonald and 7,ames (1972) indicated
that the construction of such a scale based on Ellis' irrational beliefs
was feasible and that identification with these beliefs may be associated with psychopathology.

MacDonald and Ganes (1972) evaluated the

internal consistency (reliability) of Ellis

common irrational beliefs

and the validity of identification with these beliefs as indicators of
psychopathology.

They created a Likert scale consisting of each one

of Ellis' irrational beliefs followed by a scoring range from I (completely

agree) to 9 (completely disagree).

Sixty undergraduate students were

used as subjects for the internal consistency study.
Pearson Product Moment correlations between each statement and the
total for all 11 statements revealed that nine of the statements were
reliably associated with the total score.

Items seven ( It is easier

to avoid certain difficulties and self-responsibilities than to face
them. ) and nine ( Past experienceF and events are the determiners of
present behavior; the influence of the past cannot be eradicated. )
were not shown to be associated with the total score nor were they
correlated positively with the other statements.

A Cronbach Alpha was

computed as an estimate of the internal consistency of the nine-item
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instrument.

The instrument yielded a reliability coefficient of .73.

A cross validation study was conducted using 37 graduate students as
subjects.

The same nine statements were found to be reliably associated

with the total score and a Cronbach Alpha of .79 was obtained from this
cross-validation sample.
In support of Ellis' contention that identification with these
irrational beliefs leads to neurotic behavior, significant correlations
were found between subjects' endorsement of these irrational ideas and
several measures of psychopathology.

On the California Personality

Inventory lr" of the 1P scales were significantly correlated with MacDonald
and Canes' measure of irrational beliefs scale at the .05 level.

Sig-

nificant correlations between (a) their measure of irrational beliefs
and the Eysenck Neuroticism Scale (r
Anxiety Scale (r
were found.

.37), (b) the Taylor Manifest

.41), (c) Internal-External Locus of Control (r

.44)

The results of this study indicated thatirrationality as

defined by Ellis is a measurable trait.

In addition this study offers

further support for the theoretical position of RBT.
The theoretical position of RBT is that emotions are largely
influenced by the cognitive processes.

It follows that emotional dis-

turbances oririnatP and are sustained by the cognitive processes.

Much

of the emotional disturbance suffered by individuals in our society has
been linked to a set of common irrational and self-defeating ideas
(Ellis, 1962).

MacDonald and Games (1972) have demonstrated that iden-

tification with these beliefs is associated with several measures of
psychopathology.

Since it is purported that the individual's own subset

of these irrational beliefs has created his neurosis, then it is advantareous to the therapeutic process to identify these beliefs.
has developed the YIPT1S for this purpose.

Maultsby

Since limited information
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was available on its development, reliability, or validity it was the
purpose of this study to further evaluate the usefulness of the YIPTIS
as an instrument for detecting irrational, neurosis producing beliefs.
Statement of Problem
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the YIPTIS as an instrument for identifying irrational and neurosis related beliefs.

Cross

validation of the Common Belief Scale (CBS) of the YIPTIS was accomplished and the basic psychometric characteristics of the scale were
further evaluated.

Method
Subjects
Subjects taking part in this study were volunteers from introductory psychology classes at Western Kentucky University ranging from
seventeen to twenty-seven years of age.

A total of 186 subjects, composed

of 105 females and 81 males participated.
Apparatus
Two measurement procedures were used.

First the CBS of the YIPTIS

was a 41 item self-rating questionnaire of irrational beliefs arranged
in a five point Likert scale format (See Appendix A).

Secondly, the

Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale was a self-rating questionnaire of clinically and experimentally demonstrated anxiety symptoms (See Appendix A).
Procedure
All 186 subjects were administered the CPS of the YIPTIS.

Approxi-

mately one half of this sample, 82 subjects, were also administered
the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale immediately following completion of
the CPS.

The remaining 104 subjects were retested with the CBS of the

YIPTIS two weeks later.
Design and Analysis
Item Statistics
A mean, standard deviation, and an item-total correlation were
computed across all 186 subjects for each item of the CBS.

This was

done to evaluate the contribution that each item made to the variance
and reliability of the scale.
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Reliability
A test-retest reliability coefficient was computed for the CBS
protocols of 104 subjects.

This procedure provided a measure of the

stability of the CBS by estimating the amount of variable error produced
by random fluctuations in scores from one time to another.
A split-half correlation coefficient was also computed for the
initial CPS protocols of the same 104 subjects.

The odd numbered items

formed one half of the scale and the even numbered items formed the other
half of the scale.

This procedure provided a measure of the ecuiva-

lence of the items within the scale.

The Spearman Brown prophecy formula

was used to correct for test length, which was reduced by one half in
dividing the scale.

The Guttman procedure for estimating split-half

reliability was also applied.
Validity
The concurrent validity of the CBS was evaluated by a Pearson
product-moment correlation procedure between the CBS and the TMAS for
subjects.

A principle components method of factor analysis employing

a varimax rotation was conducted for the 1e6 CBS protocols.

The purpose

of the factor analysis was to determine the structural validity of the
CBS, i.e., the number of different factors with which the CBS measures
and the amount of total variance associated with each factor.

The rela-

tionship of the identified factors to the common eleven irrational
beliefs and to the central concepts of the RBT theory were then examined
for their logical and face validity.

Results and Discussion
Item Statistics
The item means, standard deviations, and item-total correlations
for each item across all subjects on the CBS are presented in Table 1.
The majority of the items were found to be reliable indicators of the
total score and contributed to the reliability of the instrument.

However,

six of the forty-one items (10, 14, 17, 23, 32, 41) produced nonsignificant item-total correlations at the .05 level with 184 df.
Several factors were hypothesized to account for the weakness of these
items.
The face validities of item

10 (I believe there is a me and another

"real" me.) and item 32 (I believe that if I really make an honest
effort to do something and I fail at it, that means that I can't do the
thing; so, there is no rational reason to persist in trying to do it.)
were ouestionable.

In this form these items did not appear to be con-

ceptually related to any of the common eleven irrational beliefs nor
logically related to any of the central concepts of the RBT theory.
The validity of item 14 (I telieve I am incapable of sexually satisfying most normal members of the opposite sex.) appeared to be dependent
on the sexual experience of the respondent.

As the majority of subjects

in this study were college freshman many of them may not have had the
sexual experience necessary to formulate a belief about their sexual
adeluacy.

As a result, responses to this item would not necessarily be

related to the rational construct.

The correlation of this item with

the total scale may have been low as a result of the sample utilized.
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Item 17 (I believe I should be more masculine.) produced the lowest
standard deviation (.74) of the forty-one items on the scale.

The lack

of variability in response to this item accounted for the low item-total
correlation.
Item 23 (I believe that worry does sometimes help me.) assumed that
worry could

be beneficial.

considered irrational.

Identification with this belief is thus

However, Speilberger (1972) has discussed research

which indicated that low levels of anxiety can enhance performance on
some perceptual -motor and cornitive tasks and can also serve as a motivator.

It would appear then that "worry does sometimes help" and that

this belief is not related to the neurosis producing irrational construct.
Item 41 (I believe that magic or supernatural powers are causal
factors in life events.) was not completed by twelve subjects.
analysis missing data was given a neutral score.

In the

The influence of the

missing data plus the varue meaning of the statement may have produced
a low item-total correlation.
Appendix B contains a rewritten version of the items with nonThese items were rewritten tc

significant item-total correlations.
eliminate the problems cited above.

Appendix B also contains a group

of items which had adequate item-total correlations but were rewritten
due to the vague meaning of the items.

A further discussion of these

items and their influence on the reliability of the scale appears in the
following section.
Reliability
The test-retest reliability analysis yielded a stability coefficient
of .82.

Internal consistency was evaluated by several split-half pro-

cedures which resulted in a correlation between forms of .67.

This was

corrected to a reliability coefficient of .P0 by use of the Spearman-Brown
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prophecy formula.

The Cuttman split-half reliability procedure yielded

a coefficient of .80.
These results indicate that the CBS is an adequately reliable instrument.

The test-retest procedure has provided evidence for the

stability of the instrument.

The variance in performance from the first

testing to the second testing two weeks later can be partially accounted
for by a true fluctuation in the construct.

The test-retest procedure,

however, is also influenced by the subjects' remembering their rerponses,
which tends to increase the reliability coefficient.

In general, random

fluctuatione in performance and measurement error did not significantly
Impair the reliability of the instrument.
The split-half and Guttman procedures indicated the internal consistency of the CBS.

It appeared that this instrument was comprised of

a homogeneous group of items mainly sampling a single construct.

Measure-

ment error from this procedure resulted from variance in response within
the instrument.

This type of error may be caused, for example, by the

imprecise wording of an item which may make it open to various interpretations.

This type of error probably accounted for a significant

proportion of the error variance on the CBS.
The CPS is particularly vulnerable to this type of error because
it frequently uses terms which have a clearly defined and distinct
meaning within the RFT framework, such as "should," "need," and "must
have" but appear to be open to varying interpretations by many subjects.
According to Vertes (1971) the use of these words sirnals an unrealistic
demand that is being made on the world.

If not met the demanding indi-

vidual will conclude that some injustice has been done and will likely
feel anger, depression, self-blame or some other negative emotion.
Whether all people who identify with such CS items as "I believe
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ought to be or should be different from what I am" and "I believe I
need more self-confidence" interpret them as a dire need or blind expectation is doubtful.

The respondent may not focus on the implications

of the words "should" and "need" but may rather respond on these items
to the idea of its being more desirable to be different or to have more
self-confidence.

As a result a person who believes strongly that he

would like to be different or have more self-confidence, which may be
ouite rational, is likely to respond in the irrational direction to
these items on the CBS.
Seven items (1, 4, 0, 11, 17, 21,

3e)

have been identified which

appear to be open to varying interpretations.

These items have been

rewritten and appear in Appendix B.
The arrangement of some of the items on the CBS may have produced
a spurious increase in the reliability of the scale.

Several pairs of

items [(2, 1), (2, 27), (33, 34), (39, 40)] which sample the same
specific belief appear together in the present format of the scale.

It

is possible that a subject's response on the first item of the pair would
influence his response on the following item.

This could introduce a

bias into the measurement of the construct that would tend to erroneously
increase the test reliability.

This problem could be corrected by

separating these pairs of items.
In its present form the CBS appears to be an adecuately reliable
instrument.

The recommended changes in the items and the format of the

scale, however, can be expected to result in a more accurate instrument.
Validity
A Pearson product moment concurrent validity procedure between the
CBS and the Taylor manifest Anxiety Scale (TYAS) yielded a coefficient
of .27.

The correlation of .27 obtained between these scales for 82
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subjects was significant from a zero correlation at the .01 level.

This

low but significant relationship between the CBS and the TMAS war consistent with MacDonald and Games (1972) finding of a significant correlation between identification with Ellis' common eleven irrational
beliefs and the TMAS.

MacDonald and Games reported a correlation of

.41 which was significant at the .01 level.
The TMAS has been shown to be a valid and reliable indicator of
manifest anxiety (Taylor, 1953).

It also has a demonstrated usefulness

as an indication of neurosis (Matarazzo, 1955).

The TMAS then is a use-

ful indicator of one type of negative emotion, which is a common symptom
of neurosis.
The correlation between the CBS and the TMAS offers empirical
support for the view that identification with the beliefs on the CBS is
associated with heightened anxiety.

This correlation seems impressive

if it is noted that identification with the irrational beliefs comprising
the CBS is expected to evoke a wide range of negative emotions, e.g.
anger, depression, guilt, as well as anxiety.

As anxiety is a common

symptom of neurosis the relationship between the CBS and the TMAS indicates
that the CBS has potential usefulness in evaluating neurosis related
irrational beliefs.
A factor analysis of item responses revealed that the CBS was composed of fourteen reliable factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0.
These fourteen reliable factors accounted for 61 ?? of the total variance.
Table 2 contains the factor loadings assembled with the varimax rotation.
After rotation the items from each factor with factor loadings of
approximately .30 or greater were selected and examined for their conceptual relationship.

It was found that most of the fourteen factors

were logically and conceptually related to one or more of the eleven
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-0.04341
0.0070';
✓.07740
0.09566
0.59179
0.10408
0.12212
0.10918
0.01765
0.10001
0.26989
0.02400
0.2)855
0.17105
O .11658
0.36661
0.17180
0.02572
0.02119
0.01 164
0.12391
0.00469
0.08178
0.05557
0.07624
0.06559
9,o4909

FACTnR 12

-0.00925
0.(494$10
-0.04111
-0.069(,4
0.6071?
0.11171
0.22c,64
-0.11750
-0.09461
0.01156
0.21714
0.09090
m.11702
0.01695
0.144(1
0.00954
0.10270
-0.128 19
0.08029
0.02060
0.01595
0.12941
-0.1010R

0.00774,

0.01528
-0.06227
-0.06897
0.11288
0.02255
i,.01709
0.01752
0.1944Q
-0.05124
-0.01061
0.24155
0.01085
0.16,712
0.08099
0.08196
-0.(127ol
-0.02711

FACTfl8 13

0.17215
0.05770
14.1,,7291
-0.05411
-0.19811
-0.118(0
-0.02940
0.51102
-0.0111 m
0.1',071
-0.11412
-0.09729
-0.0.4024
-0.111181
-0.00s.A4
-0.P82g1
0.05101

0.0701;9
0.0160 1
0.1S7v6
-(4.(41435
0.17'4 71
-0.00197
0.01163
0.097‘18

-(4,]33P5
0.11S62
0.127/0
0.11860
0.1146F
-0.0111.5
14 .05656
M.0P776
-0.11654
-0.01915
0.10P42
0.01445
0.01498
0.06266
-0.p,001
0.26404

FACTflP 14
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common irrational beliefs or to one of the central concepts of the RBT
theory (See Appendix C for further detail).
The factor which accounted for the largest percentage of the variance
was labeled Emotional Varic.

The items which composed this factor were

logically related to the belief that emotions are responses that arise
independently of our thinking and of our control.

They also conveyed

a belief in the benevolent power of an emotional response to resolve
conflict if it is an honest emotional reaction.

According to RBT theory

this is an unrealistic and self-defeating view of emotions.

The central

tenet of RBT theory is its explanation of emotional arousal which
emphasizes that an emotional response to a situation is directly related
to the irv'ividual's cognitive interpretation of that situation.

As such,

emotions are controllable. 'ith regard to the value of an honest emotional response, it is clear that a person may honestly feel rare or
depression but if this feeling has arisen from irrational thinking his
emotional reaction is probably more self-defeating than containing
any benevolent problem-solving qualities.
The factors labeled Dissatisfaction with Self, Need for Improvement,
an

Self-Image, are all closely linked, conceptually.

The items which

composed these factors reflect another way cf thinking which the RBT
system considers common but irrational.

These items generally indicated

a need to feel competent and adecuate in all possible respects before
the person could accept himself.

A person who believes he must be

thoroughly competent, and without fault or weakness to be acceptable
will always be prone to feelings of dissatisfaction and non-acceptance
of himself.
The Neer! for Approval factor contained a cluster of items which
corresponded with one of the common eleven irrational beliefs.

These
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items reflect an impossible demand that one must be loved or approved
of by virtually every significant other.
The items of the Frojectinr Plane factor corresponded to another
of the common irrational belief.

These items indicated a belief that

other people or external events are the cause of one's unhappiness.
The Punishment factor is the logical follow-up to the Projecting
Flame factor.

The items of this factor reflected the belief that there

are objectively defined standards of right and wrong which can best be
maintained by the use of punishment and guilt.
The factor labeled Bad Me reflected a rejection of self or at least
some aspects of the self.

It indicated a belief that something about

oneself is unworthy and unacceptable.

The rational alternative to this

belief and one of the central themes of the rational philosophy is the
concept of the fallible human being.
The You are Your Pehavior factor as in the Bad Me factor reflected
an irrational view of perronal worth which
human being concept.

is

antithetical to the fallible

A person who has accepted his own fallible nature

would realize, for example, that foolish behavior does not make one a
fool.
The Less Worthy factor reflected an attitude often adopted by individuals who believe that they need the love or approval of virtually
every significant person in their lives.

This inevitably leads to

unhappiness as they never get what they want or think they need.
Four of the reliable fourteen factors (9, 12, 13, 14) could not be
labeled.

These factors did not have enough conceptually linked clusters

of items to provide a logical label for the factor.

The majority of

items comprisinr these factors, however, could be individually linked
to one or more of the common eleven irrational beliefs or central concepts
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ne the RBI' theory.

Tt should be noted, however, that the number of

subjects utilized In this analysis (186) was culte small for factor
analytical purposes and the results can give only a general indication
of the factors present.

The four unnamed factors could join other

factors or form a single more meaningful factor with a larger sample.
From an examination of the conceptual content of the items in each
factor it was evident that few of the factors were dominated by items
which reflected a single irrational belief.

nDst of the factors con-

tained clusters of items that corresponded logically to more than one
of the common eleven irrational beliefs.

As a result, a one to one

correspondence between beliefs and factors was not present.
The factors that did not correspond to any single irrational belief
did, however, relate to the central concepts of RBT.

The major tenet

of RBT is that emotions have cognitive origins and can be controlled.
The single factor, Emotional Yagic, accounting for the largest percent
of the variance of the CBS is logically related to this concept.

Simi-

larly, the concept of the fallible human being is one of the most important
aspects of the rational philosophy.

Many of the common irrational beliefs

reflect an illogical, self-defeating means of self-evaluation.

Several

of the identified factors on the CBS also reflect illogical and irrational self-evaluations.
The factor analysis revealed fourteen reliable factors, ten of
which were conceptually labeled and logically linked to Ellis' irrational
beliefs or to the central concept of the theory.

This finding has pro-

vided evidence for the content validity of the CBS.

Implications
The YIPTIS was developed as a self-assessment instrument for adults
of at least average intelligence to evaluate their strength of identification with a defined set of common irrational and neurosis related
ideas (Maultsby, 1971).

The YIPTIS is a checklist of specific percep-

tions, traits, and beliefs in the form of self-talk which reflects
these common irrational ideas.

It is purported that in a therapeutic

setting the information obtained from the YIPTIS can be used by the
client and therapist to identify the specific irrational ideas and
behaviors that are creating and sustaining the client's disturbance.
Identification of the client's own irrationalities is an important step
within the RPT model of psychotherapy (Ellis, 1962).
The present study has indicated that the CBS of the YIPTIS is an
adepuately reliable instrument for use ac an aid in evaluating the
strength and presence of irrational beliefs in a college student population.

Tt appeared to be sampling the major irrational beliefs and

assumptions which the RBT theory hypothesizes to be neurosis producing.
This study also indicated that identification with these beliefs was
associated with anxiety, a common symptom of neurosis (Coleman, 1972).
In its present form the CBS appears to be a potentially useful aid in
identifying irrational beliefs associated with anxiety and neurosis.
The present research does, however, indicate that further development of the CBS could improve the usefulness of the instrument.

Rewritten

versions of the items identified an having non-significant item-total
correlations may improve the reliability and validity of the scale.
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In addition, Hanley (1959) has shown that wording of personality
test items which leaves the meaning of items open for varying internretations can result in an acnuiescent response bias.

The imprecise

wording of some of the CBS items together with the scoring of agreement
with these statements of beliefs as irrational may result in an accuiescent response set.

A future study could investigate the degree to which

such a response bias influences scorer on the CBS.
Although the present study has found the CBS to be a potentially
useful instrument in its present form, further development of the scale
is recommended to improve the basic psychometric characteristics of the
scale.

The CBS is one of three scales which comprise the YIPTIS.

The

psychometric characteristics of the Common Perception Scale (CPS) and
the Common Trait Scale (CTS) also need further investigation.

The

degree of correlation between these three scales should also be established.
In addition to further development of the total YIPTIS battery some
future research with the CBS is recommended.

The influence of the

rewritten versions of the identified weak items (Appendix B) on the
reliability and validity of the scale should be examined.

The present

study provided preliminary evidence for the presence of a number of
identifiable factors associated with specific irrational beliefs or
specific RT7 concepts.

The factor analytical arproach to the structural

validity of the CBS should be further examined with a factor analysis
utilizing a larger sample size.
Investigation of the influence of the social desirability of the
perceptions, traits, and beliefs contained in the YIPTIS might be -'one.
The influence of the social desirability factor on the respondents'
performance on the scale could provide further insight into the interpretation of information obtained by the YIPTIS.

MacDonald and Canes
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(1972) found a low correlation between the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale and identification with a scale composed of Ellis' eleven
irrational ideas.

They concluded that their scale was free from a

social desirability response bias.
Further validation of the YIPTIS as an indicator of osychopatholopically related perceptions. traits and beliefs is also recommended.
The YIPTIS scores of diagnosed patients beginninP therapy could be compared to a "normal" control group.

Further validation could also be

achieved by investigating the correlation between the YIPTIS and established measures of psychopathology such as the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI).
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APPENDIX A

Test Booklet and Directions for the
Common Belief Scale and
the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale

41
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tie would appreciate your cooperation in this research project by completing this short nuestionnairr on commonly held beliefs. Your
responses will be kept confidential. It is not the purpose of this
study to examine or evaluate any individual's specific responses or
total questionnaire.
Detach the answer sheet from the test booklet and print your name, age,
sex, and date of birth at the top of the answer sheet in the spaces
provided. It is necessary to nut your name on the answer sheet because
you may be asked to complete a second questionnaire at a later date and
this answer sheet will then be returned to you.
Now, look at
42, -41, and Y4 on the answer sheet and notice that the
answer sheet is numbered from left to right. This is unusual so please
be careful to follow this number senuence when recording your answers.
PART I
The statements on the Common Belief Scale are beliefs that many people
hold. Below each statement is an estimate range. Please mark on the
answer sheet (not the t3st becklet) the word that seems most accurate
and appropriate to you.
This form is concerned with your usual state of mind or belief strength.
Daily fluctuations which change with the times, the places, and the
people involved will constitute periodic exceptions in your way of
thinking but only your most common, or typical belief strengths should
be marked.
In terms of percentare of time, "mildly" is about 25%, "moderately" is
of the time. Don't skip any items.
and "strongly" is about 7
about
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Never
1. I believe that I ouEht to
be or should be different
from what I am.

a

2. I believe I need more
self-confidence.

a

3. I believe that I would like
and accept myself better if
I had more self-confidence. a
4. I believe I ought to be a
better person.

a

. I believe all people should
have worthwhile lives.
a
I believe that if I act
differently from my usual
self, I will be a phony.

a

7. I believe that a person's
behavior describes the
person.

a

P. I believe I am a born
worrier.

a

9. I believe that people should
live up to their potential. a
10. I believe there is me and
another "real" me.

a

11. I believe that my emotional
feelings are more important
for my self-understanding
than my thoughts.
a
12. I believe a person has got to
be unhappy if he has few
or no real friends (i.e.,
people who really care).
a
11. I believe I should be more
intelligent than I am.

a

14. I believe I am incapable of
exually satisfying most
normal members of the
opposite sex.
a

Mildly '/oderately

StronFly

Absolutely
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Never
l. I believe neople must have
goals, purpose, and direction
in life which are generally
accepted as worthwhile before
they can accept themselves. a
16. I believe that if people
really get to know the real
me, they will not like me.

a

37. I believe I should be more
masculine.

a

1P. I believe I should be more
feminine.

a

10. Regardless of their attempts
to deceive me, I believe
that I can tell pretty well
what people are thinking
a
about me.
20. I believe what is real to
me is the most important
reality for me to consider
when solving my personal
problems.

a

21. I believe I ought to try to
please other people even if
I am not pleased.

a

?". T believe that it is my
regrettable or abnormal past
that is causing most of my
a
personal problems.
23. I believe that worry does
sometimes help me.

a

24. I believe that most people who
don't behave the way they
should behave ought to be
a
punished.
2. I believe that it is natural
and normal to get upset if
really important things don't
a
go the way they should.
76. I believe that people who
try to control their emotions
don't really enjoy life; they
a
are like robots.

Mildly

Moderately

Strongly

Absolutely
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Never
27. I believe a person is
happiest when his emotions
are free and uncontrolled.

a

Mildly
b

Moderately
c

Strongly
d

Absolutely
e

9P. I believe that a person who

does not feel auilty about
his shortcomings and failures
is not a whole person; I mean,
that person has to be some
kind of psychopath.
a
2

I believe that how badly I
feel when a loved one leaves
me or is hurt shows me how
much I really care for that
person.

a

30. I believe that being really
sincere in my desires and
really honest in my emotional
experiences are the most important factors that make
things turn out the way I want
a
them to.
31. I believe that my present
emotional responses to people
and life events are the only
real, natural and normal
feelings for me to have, and
I wouldn't be "for real," the
a
real me, if I changed this,
12. I believe that if I really
make an honest effort to do
something and I fail at it,
that means that I can't do the
thing; so, there is no rational
reason to persist in trying
to do it.
a

33. I believe that if certain
people were to treat me the
way they should, I could feel
better and/or accept myself
a
better.
314. I believe that if I could
make certain people see how
their actions cause emotional
pain, they would treat me
a
better.

ii

e

L6

Never

Mildly

3. I believe that people have
to like themselves in order
to accept themselves.

a

-36. I believe that there are
standards of right and wrong
that ourht to be followed
regardless of personal
a
feelinrs.
37. I believe that everyone
needs and has to be loved
in order to accept himself.

a

38. I believe that everyone ought
to put other people's feelings
ahead of their own more
a
often.
19. I believe that how other
people treat you is the main
factor in determining your
feelings of worth and selfa
acceptance.

40. I believe that if people would
just be honest with me, I
wouldn't have so many
emotional problems.
41

a

I believe that marical or
other supernatural powers are
causal factors in life
a
events,

b

Moderately

Stronrly

Absolutely
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PART II
Directions

Turn your answer sheet over. At the to print your name in the space
provided. The statements on Part II of this questionnaire are to be
answered either True or False as they most commonly describe your
feelings, beliefs, or behaviors. Mark your responses on the back of
your answer sheet (not the test booklet) beginning with -71151, and
again working from left to right on your answer sheet. To indicate true
on your answer sheet mark the space under (a). To indicate False, mark
the space under (b). Do not skip any items.
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PART II
1 51.

I do not tire nuickly.

152.

I am often sick to my stomach.

151.

I am about a- nervous as other people.

1C4.

I have very few headaches.

155.

I work under a great deal of strain.

1c6.

I cannot keep my mind on one thing.

157.

I worry over money and business.

158.

I frenuentiv notice my hand shakes when I try to do something.

150.

I blush as often as others.

140.

I have diarrhea ("the runs") once a month or more.

161.

I worry nuite a bit over possible troubles.

162.

I practically never blush.

163.

I am often afraid that I am going to blush.

164.

I have nightmares every few nights.

16c. "y hands and feet are usually warm enough.
166.

I sweat very easily even on cool days.

167.

When embarrassed I often break out in a sweat which is very annoying.

16P.

I do not often notice my heart pounding and I am seldom short of
breath.

160.

I reel hungry almost all the time.

170.

Cften my bowels don't move for several days at a time.

171.

I have a great deal of stomach trouble.

172.

At times I lose sleer over worry.

173. "y sleep is restless and disturbed.
174.

I often dream about things I don't like to tell other people.

175.

I am easily embarrassed.

176.

My feelings are hurt easier than most people.
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177.

T often find myself worrying about something.

17P.

I wish I could be as happy a

170.

I am usually calm and not easily upset.

180.

I cry easily.

181.

I feel anxious about something or someone almost all of the time.

182.

I am harpy most of the time.

183.

It makes

184.

At times I am so restless that I cannot sit in a chair for very long.

185.

Sometimes I become so excited that I find it hard to get to sleep.

1 99.

I have often felt that I faced so many difficulties I could not
overcome them.

187.

At times I have been worried beyond reason about something that
really did not matter.

188.

I do not have as many fears as my friends.

180.

I have been afraid of thinrs or people that I know could not hurt me.

190.

I certainly feel useless at times.

191.

I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.

192.

I am more self-conscious than most people.

193.

I am the kind of person who takes thinrs hard.

194.

I am a very nervous per-on.

19.

Life is often a strain for me.

196.

At times ; think I am no rood at all.

197.

I am not at all confident of myself.

198.

At times I feel that T am going to crack up.

199.

I don't like to face a difficulty or make an important decision.

'00.

I am very confident of myself.

MP

others.

nervous to have to wait.

Rewritten Versions of some of the
Common Belief Scale Items
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1.

I believe I have to change some things about myself before I can
accept myself.

4.

I believe that I cannot change some of my bad habits.

9.

I believe that people who don't live up to their potential are
wasting their lives.

10.

I believe there are things about myself I can never accept.

13.

I believe that if I had more intelligence I would be happier.

17.

I believe if I were more masculine I would accept myself more.

21.

I believe that I an selfish because I usually please myself first
and others second.
I believe that it is natural to worry about the future.

32.

I believe that failure is one of the hardest things for me to accept.

38.

I believe that everyone should put other people's feelings ahead
of their own more often because it is the right way to be.

41.

I believe that I have little control over what happens in my life.

AFTENDIX C
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Common Belief Scale Factor Compositions

54

55
Factor 1:

Emotional Magic
%O.

I believe what is real to me is the most important
reality for me to consider when solving my personal
problems.

2c.

I believe that it is natural and normal to get upset
if really important things don't go the way they should.

24.

I believe that people who try to control their emotions
don't really enjoy life; they are like robots.

.

1 believe a person is happiest when his emotions are
free and uncontrolled.

29.

I believe that how badly I feel when a loved one leaves
me or is hurt shows how much I really care for that
person.
I believe that being really sincere in my desires and
really honest in my emotional experiences are the most
important factors that make things turn out the way I
want them to.

71.

Factor ?:

I believe that my present emotional responses to people
and life events are the only real, natural and normal
feelings for me to have, and I wouldn't be "for real,"
the real me, if I changed them.

Dissatisfaction with Self
1.

I believe that I ought to be or should be different fror
what I am.

2.

I believe I need more self-confidence.
I believe that I would like and accept myself better if
I had more self-confidence.

Factor 1:

4.

I believe I ought to be a better person.

P.

I believe I am a born worrier.

Need for Approval
5.

I believe all people should have worthwhile lives.

7.

I believe that a person's behavior describes the person.

17.

I believe that a person has got to be unhappy if he has
few or no real friends (i.e.: people who really care).

15.

I believe people must have goals, purpose, and direction
in life which are generally accepted as horthwhile before
they can accept themselves.
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35. I believe that people have to like themselves in order
to accept themselve-.
.3).

7.

I believe that there are standards of right and wrong
that ourht to be followed regardless of personal feelings.
I believe that everyone needs and has rot to be loved
in order to accept himself.
I believe that how other people treat you is the main
factor in determining your feelings of worth and selfacceptance.

Factor 4: Projecting Blame
13.

I believe I should be more intelligent than I am.
I believe that it is my regrettable or abnormal past
that is causing most of my personal problems.
I believe that if certain people were to treat me the
way they should, I could feel better and/or accept
myself better.

34.

I believe that if I could make certain people see how
their actions cause emotional pain, they would treat
me better.

40.

I believe that if people would just he honest with me,
I wouldn't have so many emotional problems.

41.

I believe that magical or other supernatural powerare causal factors in life events.

'actor c: Self-Image

-actor

17.

I believe I should be more masculine.

1.

I believe I should be more feminine.

6: I:eed for Improvement
4. I believe I ought to be a better person.
13.

I believe I should be more intelligent than I an.

Factor 7: Punishment
15.

I believe that people must have goals, purpose, and
direction in life which are generally accepted as worthwhile before they can accept themselves.

?1.

I believe I ourht to try to please other people even if
I am not pleased.
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Factor P:

24.

I believe that most people who don't behave the way they
should behave ought to be punished.

2P..

I believe that a person who does not feel guilty about
his shortcomings and failures is not a whole person;
I mean, that person has to be some kind of psychopath.

16.

I believe that there are standards of right and wrong
that ought to be followed regardless of personal feelings.

Bad Me
1.

10.

I believe that I ought to be or should be different
from what I am.
I believe there is a me and another "real' me.

16. I believe that if people really pet to know the real me,
they will not like me.
22.

Factor 9:

I believe that it is my regrettable or abnormal past
that is causing most of my personal problems.

You are Your Behavior
4.

I believe that if I act differently from my usual self
I will be a phony.
I believe that a person's behavior describes the person.

.

I believe that my present emotional responser to people
and life event- are the only real, natural and normal
feelings for me to have, and I wouldn't be "for real",
the real me, if I changed them.

Factor 10: Less Worthy
21.

I believe I ought to try to please other people even if
I am not pleased.

38. I believe that everyone ouFht to put other people's
feelings ahead of their own more often.
Unnamed Factor I:
1. I believe a Person has got to be unharpy if he has few
or no real friends (i.e.; people who really care).
14.

I believe I am incapable of sexually satisfying most
normal members of the opposite sex.

39. I believe that how other people treat you is the main
factor in determining your feelings of worth and
self-acceptance.
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Unnamed Factor II:
q.

ial.
I believe that people should live up to their potent

11.

ant
I believe that my emotional feelings are more import
ts.
though
my
than
g
tandin
for my self unders

1Q.

7P.

30.

e
Regardless of their attempts to deceive me, I believ
about
ng
thinki
are
people
what
well
that I can tell pretty
me.
I believe that how badly I feel when a loved one leaves
me or is hurt shows how much I really care for that person.
I believe that being really cincere in my desires and
really honest in my emotional experiences are the most
I
important factors that make things turn out the way
want them to.

Unnamed Factor III:
23.

I believe that worry does sometimes help me.

Unnamed Factor IV:
I believe that if I really make an honest effort to do
something and I fail at it, that means that I can't do
the thing; so, there is no rational reason to persist
in trying to do it.

